Imho this conflict goes beyond the BTC pipeline. You just can't reason with emotion.
Once again, this conflict proves America has placed its bet on the wrong horse.

One question or two: Why are there 1,000 Israeli advisers alongside 1,200 U.S. trainers in Georgia?

There are many other views - that "America bears considerable responsibility".... "what is good for the goose is good for the gander"

Belgravia Dispatch via The Washington Note

Saakashvili: Inglorious Democrat?

A few quick points, in no particular order. First, let us disabuse ourselves from the notion that Mr. Saakashvili is some glorious democrat (the election he barely won in January included irregularities, and there continues to be endemic corruption in Tblisi).

Second, let us recall that many south Ossetians and Abkhazians are not particularly keen to live under Tbilisi's yoke, indeed some prefer Russian influence to predominate there for the time being.

Third, if there is any truth to Russian allegations that there are some 1,500 fatalities in the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali--and they were caused by a major initial over-reach by the Georgian military (we will need to wait for more details to emerge)--expect many more brutish bombardments like the Russians apparently have conducted in the Georgian town of Gori, alas.

Fourth, some context: ever since the overly hasty recognition of Kosovo went live, Putin has been very keen to intimate what's good for the goose is good for the gander, having personally threatened Saakashvili that Russia would formally recognize as independent states Ossetia and Abkhazia. Unfair and inconvenient, at least to Georgian 'sovereignists' (or, to others, irrendentists)? Yes, to a fashion, as the perils of too breezy analogizing among these different situations is quite clear. Still, the Kosovo precedent was going to be used to Putin's purposes, of course, humiliating as the events in Pristina were to Moscow, and with the barely concealed breezy cheerleading from Brussels and DC adding insult to injury.[.]

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A balanced article published in IHT/NYT - Taunting the Bear

And published in Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 2007 Losing Russia
- Dimitri K. Simes

Despite numerous opportunities for strategic cooperation over the past 16 years, Washington's diplomatic behavior has left the unmistakable impression that making Russia a strategic partner has never been a major priority. The administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush assumed that when they needed Russian cooperation, they could secure it without special effort or accommodation.

The Clinton administration in particular appeared to view Russia like postwar Germany or Japan -- as a country that could be forced to follow U.S. policies and would eventually learn to like them. They seemed to forget that Russia had not been occupied by U.S. soldiers or devastated by atomic bombs. Russia was transformed, not defeated. This profoundly shaped its responses to the United States.

Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, Russia has not acted like a client state, a reliable ally, or a true friend -- but nor has it behaved like an enemy, much less an enemy with global ambitions and a hostile and messianic ideology. Yet the risk that Russia may join the ranks of U.S. adversaries is very real today. To avoid such an outcome, Washington must understand where it has gone wrong -- and take appropriate steps today to reverse the downward spiral.