It's kind of sad to watch our foreign policy elite flail around impotently, lecturing Russia about international rules, international institutions, and respect for sovereignty. Russia, as you might remember, refused to vote for any authorization to use military force in Iraq. Now they get treated to gems like this from Condi 'Mushroom Cloud' Rice:

However, as U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived at Bush's ranch at 5:30 a.m. Saturday to brief the president on negotiations in Tbilisi, Georgia, she told reporters Russia faces a choice "to act in a 21st-century way, [to] fully integrate into the international institutions.

"I think it's very much worthwhile to have given Russia that chance," Rice said. "Now I think the behavior recently suggests that perhaps Russia has not taken that route ... or that they would like to have it both ways -- that is, that you behave in a 1968 way toward your neighbors by invading them and, at the same time, you continue to integrate into the political and diplomatic and economic and security structures of the international community. And I think the fact is you can't have it both ways."

One wonders whether Rice is truly deaf to irony.

"[The Russians] have a kind of imperial hangover," said Fred Starr, a professor at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. "They haven't adjusted to post-Soviet reality."

I don't think Fred Starr has adjusted to post-Iraq War reality. But at least he is on-message, unlike this envoy:

In Georgia, popular anger against Russia remains high, and Saakashvili has yet to be called to account for the decision to assault Tskhinvali, a small city in which thousands of civilians were forced into their cellars by shelling.

Russian officials say 2,000 people died in Tskhinvali. That figure has been described as inflated by human rights groups. But there unquestionably was a large toll of civilian deaths and injuries, which has outraged Russia and shocked Georgia's Western allies.

"It's deplorable, simply deplorable, to fire on civilians like that, and illegal," said Matthew Bryza, the U.S. special envoy to the region, in an interview. "It's horrible."

Regardless of who started this conflict, Russia is the stronger of the two, and the disputed regions are made up of ethnic Russians. The simplest way to resolve this issue is for Georgia to give up on ever regaining control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. They did not control them before and they will not emerge from a lost war with greater control than they enjoyed before the conflict. However, one lesson we did learn from Germany's annexation of the Sudetanland in 1938 is that the peaceful resolution of an ethnic-fueled border dispute can be a mere precursor for more imperial ambitions. Georgia's territorial integrity and political independence from Russia is worth defending, and the best way to defend it is through negotiation. If Georgia is going to give a nod to reality, they'll realize that South Ossetia and Abkhazia are gone. Formally acknowledging that fact may be deeply humiliating, but it is also one card they can play that Russia would actually value.

It is now clear that Russia opposes the integration of Georgia into NATO so strongly that they are willing to use military force to prevent it. But the pretext for military force is completely dependent on South Ossetia and Abkhazia remaining disputed territories within Georgia. What Georgia should do is to trade their claim to South Ossetia and Abkhazia for Russian acceptance of stepped up and semi-formalized security arrangements from the West to protect their remaining territory. Basically, Georgia would be saying that they recognize Russia's military might and advantage but that in return for that acknowledgment they want Russia to recognize the legitimacy of the rest of Georgia and their right to seek out whatever allies they choose to protect their sovereignty.

Or, if we are going to use the favored language of the neo-cons (Munich, never again), it would be like trading the Sudetanland for German acknowledgment that the rest of Czech territory in inviolable, Western promises to protect Czechoslovakia from further territorial encroachment, and stepped up military aid to Czechoslovakia. This analogy is not perfect because the Munich capitulation stripped Prague of its natural and entrenched defenses against invasion. But Russia is not Nazi Germany, and they should be more responsive to honest, tough-nosed diplomacy and negotiation.

Whether that position is naive or not, it is a better deal for Georgia than they will get by refusing to acknowledge military reality and nursing a delusional hope of ever exercising dominion over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It shows Russia respect but also lays down a marker. It recognizes our own weakness without capitulating to Russian force.

If we let Georgian pride interfere, the region will be a permanent flash-point. The West overplayed their hand in Kosovo and Georgia and they need to negotiate for what they have some reasonable expectation of achieving. This solution, over the long-term, will make Georgia a more secure nation. After all, Russia could annex Georgia altogether in less than a week if they wanted to. The goal should be to change that vulnerability over time by raising the stakes (in trade, public relations, and military cost) of any Russian annexation of Georgia. For now, we are dealing from a position of profound weakness. Smart diplomacy, including painful tradeoffs, is the best route to securing Georgia's independence.